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Abstract
This paper investigates who wins and who loses when rms depart from a mass adver-
tising/uniform pricing strategy (benchmark model) to a targeted advertising/price discrim-
ination one. We characterize the equilibrium outcomes in both settings. Then, we address
the competitive and welfare e¤ects of personalized pricing with targeted advertising by com-
paring the results obtained under this business strategy to the ones arising under the mass
strategy. We show that all segment consumers are expected to pay higher average prices
under the personalized advertising/pricing strategy. We also show that the personalized
strategy might be a winning strategy for rms. The overall welfare e¤ects of the personal-
ized strategy are ambiguous. However, even when the personalized strategy boosts overall
welfare, consumers might all be worse-o¤. Thus the paper gives support to concerns that
have been raised regarding the rmsability to adopt personalized strategies to boost prots
at the expense of consumers.
1 Introduction
The recent innovation in information technologies has drastically changed rmsmarketing and
communication strategies, allowing rms to send personalized information (including personal-
ized price o¤ers) to their customers. On the one hand, it is now much easier for rms to gather,
store and process consumer-specic data, which increases their ability to segment consumers
with di¤erent proles. On the other hand, rms are now able to deliver timely, targeted and
local informative/ advertising content in an unprecedented way.1
We thank Noriaki Matsushima for detailed comments on an earlier version of this manuscript. This research
has been nanced by the European Regional Development Fund through COMPETE 2020 Programa Opera-
cional Competitividade e Internacionalização (POCI) and by Portuguese public funds through FCT (Fundação
para a Ciência e a Tecnologia) within the projects PTDC/IIM-ECO/2280/2014 and POCI-01-0145-FEDER-
006890. Any errors are our own responsability.
1A particularly important development allowing for personalized communication between rms and their cus-
tomers is the generalized use of smartphones and other portable devices (e.g tablets or smartwatches). The
statistical portal Statista refers that "For 2016, the number of smartphone users is forecast to reach 2.08 billion".
See http://www.statista.com/statistics/330695/number-of-smartphone-users-worldwide/ [Date of access:19 au-
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Firms may now easily design real-time pricing strategies in which consumers get "special dis-
counts" and other advantages depending on their " location via mapping software, their browser
and search history, whom and what they like on social networks like Facebook, the songs and
videos they have streamed, their retail purchase history, the contents of their online reviews and
blog posts."2 For example, in the case of the airline industry, the adoption of personalized pricing
strategies has become quite frequent, to an extent that the IATA Resolution 787 establishes
certain goals ...including capability to provide personalized pricing o¤ers to consumers who shop
for air transportation.3
However, we are far from reaching consensus on the desirability of this type of practices.
For instance, some senators in the USA are skeptical about IATA Resolution 787 since airlines
could use that information to charge frequent business travelers higher prices.4 This discussion
illustrates how the new forms of price discrimination such as behavior-based price discrimination,
location-based pricing and other strategies involving personalized prices are challenging conven-
tional wisdom regarding the welfare e¤ects of competitive price discrimination. Both scholars
and practitioners are now participating on a lively debate regarding the pros and cons of price
discrimination through new technologies allowing for personalized communication between rms
and their customers.
In this respect, the O¢ ce of Fair Trading (2010)5 has argued that "In the online environment,
price targeting may be much less transparent, which may mean that consumers do not shop
around su¢ ciently or nd it harder to compare prices. The use of online tracking also raises
the same privacy objections as targeted advertising." Shiller (2013) also highlights some negative
e¤ects of personalized pricing. He simulates counterfactual environments in which Netix adopts
rst degree price discrimination and nds out that "some consumers pay twice as much as others
do for the exact same product". More recently, the Financial Times (2017) refers to the antitrust
challenges raised by pricing strategies relying on customized algorithms.6
In contrast, Chen (2005) argues that Price discrimination under customer recognition ... is
by and large unlikely to raise signicant antitrust concerns. In fact, as the economics literature
suggests, such pricing practices in oligopoly markets often intensify competition and potentially
benet consumers. Along the same lines, the Executive O¢ ce of the President of the United
States (2015)7 argues that "Economic reasoning suggests that di¤erential [personalized] pricing,
gust 2016]. These devices allow rms to gather considerable amounts of information on consumersbehavior and
daily activities. Moreover, they allow rms to communicate with their customers anywhere at any time in a very
e¤ective way.
2 In "Big Data and Di¤erential Pricing", February 2015, Executive O¢ ce of the President of the United States,
available online at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/les/docs/Big_Data_Report_Nonembargo_v2.pdf
3See https://www.transportation.gov/airconsumer/iata-resolution-787-order-show-cause [Accessed online 18
August 2016]
4See https://verdict.justia.com/2015/05/13/personalized-pricing-in-the-air-why-consumers-should-be-wary-
of-a-new-airline-pricing-proposal [Accessed online 19 August 2016]
5 In O¢ ce of Fair Trading, OFT1231, 2010.
6Financial Times (January, 2017) refers that "existing antitrust laws, premised on human intent and action,
may be inadequate to prevent companies from abusing their market power in the digital era, some experts say".
See: https://www.ft.com/content/9de9fb80-cd23-11e6-864f-20dcb35cede2 [Date of access: 26th January 2017]
7 In "Big Data and Di¤erential Pricing", February 2015, Executive O¢ ce of the President of the United States,
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whether online or o­ ine, can benet both buyers and sellers...Thus, we should be cautious about
proposals to regulate online pricing particularly if we believe that online markets are particularly
competitive."
In this paper, we contribute to this debate by providing an analytical study on the competi-
tive e¤ects of personalized pricing through targeted informative advertising. We rst analyze a
benchmark model in which rms only have access to mass communication technologies and are,
therefore, conned to engage in uniform pricing strategies. Then, we shed some light on the com-
petitive e¤ects of personalized ads and pricing by comparing the (price and welfare) outcomes
in this benchmark model to the ones arising in a model of personalized communication (with
targeted ads and personalized price o¤ers, as in Esteves and Resende, 2016).8 While economists
have long been concerned in understanding the prot and welfare e¤ects of price discrimination
and advertising separately, little is known about the competitive and welfare e¤ects of price dis-
crimination enabled by targeted advertising (such combination might be very important when
rms adopt strategies based on personalized communication with their customers).
The paper aims at lling in this literature gap by investigating who may be the losers and the
winners when rms implement price discrimination strategies through personalized informative
ads. More precisely, we address the following research questions: What are the price and welfare
e¤ects of personalized pricing through targeted advertising? Can rms sustain higher prices and
obtain greater prots by combining personalized ads with price discrimination strategies? Do
consumers benet from targeted ads enabling personalized pricing?
In order to address these questions, we propose a static game of duopoly competition based
on Esteves and Resende (2016). There are two rms launching two new di¤erentiated products.
As in Stahl (1994), rms need to invest in advertising to generate demand awareness. By
investing in advertising, rms endogenously segment the market into captive (partially informed)
and selective (fully informed) customers. The model exhibits best-response asymmetry (Corts,
1998): each rm has a strong and a weak market segment (a rms strong market includes
consumers with a stronger preference for that rm, whereas its weak market includes consumers
with a stronger preference for the rival market).9 More precisely, the set of potential buyers is
assumed to be composed of two distinct segments of equal mass. As in Shilony (1977), Raju et
al. (1990), Esteves (2010) and Esteves and Resende (2016), everything else the same, consumers
in segment i prefer product i over product j to a certain extent (measured by a brand awareness
available online at https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/les/docs/Big_Data_Report_Nonembargo_v2.pdf
8 In the paper we only compare our benchmark model in which rms use mass advertising (and therefore they
do not have the technical means to engage in price discrimination) to a situation in which rms can personalize
both ads and price o¤ers at the same time. We do not compare the outcomes of our benchmark model to a set-up
in which rms use targeted advertising and uniform pricing (which is also presented in Esteves and Resende,
2016) because the empirical evidence suggests that rms are actually using customized communication channels
(e.g. targeted informative ads) as a price discrimination device (see the previous examples in the text). Therefore
the most interesting welfare analysis requires the comparison of the benchmark of mass communication (with
mass advertising and uniform pricing) to a set-up of personalized communication (with targeted ads and price
discrimination).
9 In the literature of price discrimination, a market is designated as strongif in comparison to uniform pricing
a rm wishes to increase its price there. The market is said to be weakif the reverse happens.
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parameter). Accordingly, consumers may end up buying their least preferred product, provided
its price is su¢ ciently low vis-à-vis the competing product.
We depart from Esteves and Resende (2016) regarding the features of rmsadvertising and
pricing strategies. In our baseline model rms use a mass advertising strategy in which they
choose an advertising to the entire market and all ads must have the same content. Accordingly,
price discrimination is technically unfeasible (all the ads are identical, posting a similar price).
We will then analyze the price, prot and welfare e¤ects of personalized pricing through targeted
ads by comparing our ndings to Esteves and Resende (2016), who consider a model with
targeted advertising and price discrimination, without providing any insights on the welfare
outcomes or the price e¤ects of customized information.
The stylized model addressed in this paper o¤ers new insights to the literature on price
discrimination based on customer recognition. First, we nd that both rms will compete in both
market segments only when the advertising costs are not excessively high and the consumers
willingness to pay for the products is su¢ ciently high vis-à-vis the brand awareness parameter.
Second, when both rms compete in both market segments, we nd that average prices
with mass communication (mass advertising and uniform pricing) are below their counterparts
with personalized communication, regardless of the market segment. Consequently, we show
that rms are able to take advantage of the interplay between price discrimination and targeted
advertising to sustain higher prices. More precisely, we nd that expected prots with targeted
advertising and price discrimination are above (below) their non-discrimination counterparts,
provided consumerswillingness to pay for the goods is high (low) enough and/or the advertising
is not too expensive (cheap). Our results depart from the classic prisoner dilemma result that
arises in models of price discrimination (without advertising) in a set-up with fully informed
consumers and exhibiting best-response asymmetry (e.g. Thisse and Vives, 1988). Our results
also depart from Iyer et al. (2005) who argue that targeting always increases the rmsprots;
and from Brahim et al. (2010) who show that prots with mass advertising are always above the
targeting prots, provided that rms advertise both to their strong and to their weak markets.
Finally, we nd that it is not possible to make general predictions regarding the welfare ef-
fects of price discrimination through targeted ads since the expected welfare may either increase
or go down when rms move from a set-up with mass communication (mass advertising/uniform
pricing) to a set-up with personalized communication (targeted advertising/ price discrimina-
tion). However, even if welfare goes up when rms run targeted advertising campaigns with
personalized price o¤ers, rms may be the only ones beneting from this strategy. On the
contrary, consumers may end up being worse-o¤ than in the case of mass advertising/ uniform
pricing since rms take advantage of the interplay between targeted ads and price discrimination
to induce ine¢ cient shopping and relax price competition.
Related literature This paper is mainly related to two strands of the literature, namely
the literature on competition with informative advertising and the more recent literature on
price discrimination based on customer recognition.
Following the seminal work of Butters (1977), a vast literature has investigated competition
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with informative advertising (e.g. Stahl, 1994 or Grossman and Shapiro, 1984). The literature
on competitive targeted advertising is relatively recent.10 The works of Iyer et al. (2005),
Galeotti and Moraga-Gonzalez (2008) and Brahim et al. (2010) are key contributions to the
understanding of the economics of targeting advertising, namely in respect to rms pricing
and advertising decisions. Iyer et al. (2005) develop a model in which rms face two types of
consumers: captive consumers (who are loyal to one of the rms and always buy from their
favorite rm regarding the price of the other good) and shoppers (who always buy the less
expensive good). They show that targeted advertising leads to higher prots regardless of
whether rms have or not the ability to adopt price discrimination strategies.
Galeotti and Moraga-Gonzalez (2008) study rmsadvertising and pricing strategies in a
market with a homogeneous good, where market segmentation is based on consumer attributes
that are completely unrelated to tastes. The paper compares market outcomes under mass
advertising with uniform pricing and targeted advertising with price discrimination. Assuming
ex-ante that one market segment is more protable than the other one, the paper shows that the
possibility of market segmentation may lead to positive prots within an otherwise Bertrand-like
setting.11
Brahim et al. (2010) develop an extended version of Grossman and Shapiro (1984) with
targeted advertising. The authors also show that targeted advertising does not always have a
positive e¤ect on rmsprots. In particular, when rms advertise in both market segments,
targeted advertising may reduce equilibrium prots.
This paper is closely related to Esteves and Resende (2016). We enrich their work in two
ways. First, we assess welfare outcomes in the model with targeted advertising and price dis-
crimination. Second, we compare the price and welfare outcomes in their model to the ones
arising in a model of uniform pricing and mass advertising, which allow us to characterize the
strategic e¤ects arising from the interplay between targeted advertising and price discrimination.
Finally, the paper is also related to the literature on competitive price discrimination. It
is related to those models where, in the terminology of Corts (1998), the market exhibits best-
response asymmetry. In these models prot will typically decrease when rms use price discrim-
ination. A useful model for understanding the prot e¤ects of price discrimination in markets
with best-response asymmetry is by Thisse and Vives (1988). There are two rms located at
the extremes of the segment [0; 1] : Consumers are uniformly distributed in the line segment
10See for example, Bergemann and Bonatti (2011), Chandra (2009); Gal-Or and Gal-Or (2005); Gal-Or and
Gal-Or (2006); Gal-Or, Gal-Or, May and Spangler (2008).
11Esteban et al. (2006) and Esteban and Hernandez (2007) study targeted advertising in an oligopolistic market
with vertical di¤erentiation. The authors show that the possibility of targeting advertising with price discrimina-
tion may lead to permanent segmentation of the market. From a welfare perspective, targeted advertising is shown
to have a positive e¤ect on consumers surplus and social welfare. Other papers studying targeted advertising
include Roy (2000), Gal-Or and Gal-Or (2006); Gal-Or, Gal-Or, May and Spangler (2008). Roy (2000) studies
optimal advertising choices when rms can target consumers on the basis of their address (i.e. their location on
a Hotelling framework). Gal-Or and Gal-Or (2006) study the competitive e¤ects of targeted advertising when
a single media content distributor delivers advertising messages on the behalf of rms. Gal-Or, Gal-Or, May
and Spangler (2008) deal with the issue of imperfect advertising tailoring, studying to which extent an advertiser
should allocate resources to increase the quality of its targeting.
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and rms can observe the location (or brand preference) of each individual consumer and price
accordingly. They show that price discrimination intensies competition, so that all prices fall
as well as prots. Price discrimination based on customer recognition in a static model has also
been examined by Bester and Petrakis (1996). Other authors have analyzed price discrimina-
tion under customer recognition in a dynamic setting where rms recognize consumers after the
rst-period interaction. This form of price discrimination has been termed as Behavior-Based
Price Discrimination (BBPD) or price discrimination based on purchase history (e.g. Chen,
1997, Villas-Boas, 1999, Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000, Taylor, 2003, Esteves, 2010 and Gehrig et
al. 2011, 2012).12 In all of these approaches, prots fall down with price discrimination. More
recently, a few works have stressed that prots may increase with price discrimination. In static
settings due to rmsheterogeneity (e.g. Chen and Zhang (2002)), or multi-dimensional product
di¤erentiation (e.g. Esteves, 2009b). In dynamic settings, prots may increase with BBPD due
to imperfect correlated preferences across time (Chen and Pearcy, 2010) and Shin and Sudhir,
2010); and consumersfairness concerns (Esteves and Mahmood, 2017). In the previous works
there is no role for advertising since consumers are perfectly informed. Esteves (2009a) departs
from this hypothesis by looking at a set-up with informative advertising in which rms need
to invest in advertising to generate demand and inform consumers about prices. However, Es-
teves (2009a) considers that consumers are ex-ante identical regarding their preferences for the
products, whereas the present paper assumes that consumers are ex-ante heterogenous.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the main ingredients of the
benchmark model with mass advertising and uniform pricing. Section 3 briey reviews the results
of Esteves and Resende (2016) in a set-up with targeted ads and price discrimination. Then,
we proceed to the analysis of the competitive e¤ects of personalized communication (regarding
equilibrium prices, market segmentation and prots). Section 4 focuses on the welfare e¤ects
of competitive price discrimination through targeted advertising. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
The Appendix collects all the proofs.
2 Mass Advertising
2.1 The model
Consider a market with two rms, i = A;B: Each rm is launching a new good, produced at a
constant marginal cost, which is assumed to be zero without loss of generality. Firms need to
invest in informative advertising13 to generate demand, meaning that consumers are only aware
of the existence and the price of the new products when exposed to rmsad campaigns. There
is a unit mass of consumers with a common reservation price v: Each consumer buys at most a
single unit of either good A or B. The set of consumers is divided in two segments with equal
size: segment a and segment b: Consumers in segment i prefer product i over the other product
12For other recent papers on price discrimination and customer recognition see also Chen and Pearcy (2010),
Ghose and Huang (2006), Shy and Stenbacka (2012).
13 Implicitly it is assumed that search costs for new products are prohibitively high. See Bagwell (2007) for a
survey on the economics of advertising.
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by a degree equal to  > 0; which can be interpreted as the degree of consumerspreference
towards its favorite brand.14 Hence, as in Shilony (1977), Raju et al. (1990), Esteves (2010)
and Esteves and Resende (2016), we propose a model with best-response asymmetry, in which
each rm potentially has a weak and a strong segment of consumers.
In our baseline model rms only have access to mass advertising technologies and therefore
they are conned to uniform campaigns in which all the ads present exactly the same price to
all the consumers in the market (regardless of whether they have a weak or a strong preference
for their good).
We look for rmsoptimal advertising and pricing decisions in the context of a simultaneous
non-cooperative game. More precisely, the problem of rm i consists in choosing an optimal
advertising reach, i; and the corresponding uniform pricing strategy pi; i = A;B: Advertising
is a costly activity. Let A (i) =  (i) denote the advertising cost of rm i when it reaches
a fraction i of consumers, with A (0) = 0; Ai > 0 and Aii  0:15 Whenever a specic
functional form is needed, we will use the quadratic advertising technology proposed in Tirole
(1988), namely A(i) =  (i) = 
2
i in order to guarantee that our results can be compared
to the ones obtained by Esteves and Resende (2016) in a model with targeted advertising. This
specication was also used in other models like Galeotti and Moraga-Gonzalez (2008) or Brahim
et al. (2011).
After rms have sent their ads independently, a proportion i and j of customers is reached
by rm i and js advertising, respectively. Thus, in each market segment, rm i has a fraction
i
 
1  j

of captive customers, who are only aware of its product and a fraction ij of selective
consumers, who are fully informed about the existence and the price of both products. There is
also a fraction of consumers (1  i)
 
1  j

that remains uninformed.
Consider rst the case of selective consumers. In segment a they compare the net utility of
purchasing good A at price pA; v   pA; with the net utility of purchasing good B at price pB;
v      pB: For pi  v   ; i = A;B; a selective consumer in segment a buys good A if and
only if pA     pB: Analogously, a selective consumer in segment b buys good A if and only if
pA +  < pB: Similar reasoning is applied to obtain the conditions under which di¤erent types
of selective consumers buy good B. A captive consumer to rm A in segment a; buys its good
if pA  v: If instead the captive consumer belongs to segment b; he/she only buys good A when
pA  v   .
14Note that the modelling options are compatible with other interpretations for : Indeed, it could also be
interpreted as a search cost, a transportation cost (as in Shilony, 1977) or a switching cost.
15Subscripts denote partial derivatives. These assumptions on the specication of the advertising cost have the
following implication: when i goes up it becomes increasingly more expensive to inform an aditional consumer.
This is a standard assumption in the informative advertising literature (e.g. Butters, 1977 or Tirole, 1988).
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Firm is demand, Di (pi; pj) ; when rms use a mass advertising technology is given by:
Di (pi; pj) =
8>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>:
0 if pi > v
1
2i
 
1  j

if pi 2 (v   ; v] ^ pj +  < pi
1
2i
 
1  j

+ 12ij if pi 2 (v   ; v] ^ pj +   pi
i
 
1  j

if pi  v    ^ pj +  < pi
i
 
1  j

+ 12ij if pi  v    ^ pj     pi  pj + 
i
 
1  j

+ ij if pi  v    ^ pi < pj   
Firm is expected prot is equal to Ei = piDi (pi; pj) A (i) :
2.2 Equilibrium Analysis
We now study rmsequilibrium price and advertising strategies. Our analysis is focused on
the symmetric Nash equilibrium. Given the rivals strategies, j and pj ; the problem of rm i
consists of choosing the advertising intensity, i, and the price, pi that maximize its expected
prot. The next Proposition analyzes the conditions under which our price-advertising game has
an interior Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies (PSNE), considering the quadratic advertising
technology A (i) = 
2
i . We denote by p
 and m rmsoptimal choices in the symmetric
equilibrium, with pi = pj = p and i = j = 
m.
Proposition 1 (i) When v  2 and 4  v, there is an interior PSNE. The equilibrium
price is p = v and the interior equilibrium advertising intensity is m = v4 :
(ii) When v > 2 and 4  (v   )max
n
v
v 2 ;
v 2

o
; there is an interior PSNE. The
equilibrium price is p = v  and the interior equilibrium advertising intensity is m = 2(v )v +4 :
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 1 shows that the game with mass advertising and uniform pricing has an equi-
librium in pure strategies provided that advertising costs are not too low. The features of the
equilibrium depend on the magnitude of the brand awareness parameter () vis-à-vis the reser-
vation price (v). When v  2; products are very di¤erentiated in the eyes of consumers and
rms use pricing strategies to fully separate their markets (in this setting, rms are unable
to separate markets through customized information). Each rms acts as a monopolist in the
respective strong market segment, charging a price equal to v: When v  2 and advertising
costs are low 4 < v; the full segmentation equilibrium described before can also be sustained.
However, there is a corner advertising solution, with m = 1. In that case, all consumers are
informed about the existence of their favorite product and all of them are buying e¢ ciently (but
their net surplus is zero since both rms are charging a price equal to v):16
16The Proof of this result is available from the authors upon request.
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When the brand awareness parameter is not too high, in the sense that v > 2; rms are
interested in serving the weak market as well. More precisely, in case (ii) of Proposition 1, each
rm serves all the informed consumers in its strong market and the captive consumers in its weak
market. Although both rms are active in both markets, the two segments remain separated to
some extent (in the sense that rms do not compete for selective consumers in the weak market).
In this solution, rms cannot charge a price above v  (otherwise they would not serve captive
consumers in the weak market), which means that rms are unable to fully extract consumers
surplus in the strong segment. For v > 2; the revenue loss in the strong market (where rms
are giving away an amount  for each unit sold to their customers) is more than compensated
by the revenue increase resulting from extra sales to the captive consumers in the weak market,
provided that advertising costs are not too low, i.e.    v 4 maxn vv 2 ; v 2 o : When the
advertising cost goes below this threshold, the result described in part (ii) of Proposition 1 is no
longer a SPNE because rms start to be interested in competing for all the selective consumers
in the weak market. Indeed, for low ; both rms tend to advertise more (in both market
segments),17 increasing the fraction of selective consumers. The set of captive consumers in
the weak market becomes rather small and therefore the strategy relying on sales to captive
consumers in such segment becomes less attractive. The following Lemma shows that when
v > 2 and  <
 v 
4

max
n
v
v 2 ;
v 2

o
; there is no PSNE. However, we will see later that
there exists an equilibrium in mixed-strategies.
Lemma 1 When v > 2 and 4 < (v   )max
n
v
v 2 ;
v 2

o
there is no symmetric in-
terior PSNE and rms will have incentives to compete for all the selective consumers in the
market.
Proof. See the Appendix.
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is the following. If advertising is cheap enough (small ) and
 is not too high, rms may poach selective consumers in the weak market at a relatively low
cost (informing consumers is not too expensive as  is low and the discount needed to entice
consumers to buy their least preferred product is not too large since  is low). Thus, as long as v
is su¢ ciently high, the existence of a positive fraction of selective consumers with a preference for
the rival rm creates a tension between each rms incentives to price low to attract consumers
in its weak market and the rms incentives to price high to extract rents from consumers in
its strong market. In equilibrium each rm follows a mixed pricing strategy as an attempt to
prevent the rival from systematically predicting its price, which in turn makes undercutting less
likely.
From now on, we shall concentrate our analysis on the most interesting case in which rms
compete for all consumers in the market, which occurs when p  v    and Lemma 1 holds.
17Later on, we will demonstrate this result from an analytical point of view.
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Proposition 2 below characterizes the symmetric interior Nash equilibrium in mixed strate-
gies(MSNE).
Suppose that rm j randomly selects a price from the c.d.f (cumulative distribution function),
Fj(p): In a symmetric MSNE, both rms adopt the same pricing strategy, thus, for the sake
of simplicity write Fi(p) = Fj(p) = F (p). As we look at the domain p  v   ; then all
captive consumers will always buy the product from the rm they know. In the case of selective
consumers, when rm i charges price p; three events are relevant. First, if pj > p +  rm i
captures the whole group of selective consumers in the market. This occurs with probability
[1  F (p+ )] and yields a total revenue equal to pi: Second, rm i captures no selective
consumer if pj < p   : This happens with probability F (p  ) : In this case, rm i0s revenue
only stems from the sales to its captive consumers, being equal to pi
 
1  j

: Finally, each rm
serves its group of strong selective consumers (who are all buying e¢ ciently) if p  < pj < p+.
This event occurs with probability [F (p+ )  F (p  )] and yields a total revenue equal to
p

i
 
1  j

+ 12ij

:
Firm is expected prot, given the rivals decisions, can be written as follows:
Ei = pi
 
1  j

+ pij

1  1
2
F (p+ )  1
2
F (p  )

 A(i):
In an MSNE, any price chosen from a rms equilibrium price support should generate the same
expected prot, which will be denoted by km.
Proposition 2. When rms adopt a mass advertising campaign with uniform pricing, there
is a symmetric interior MSNE with both rms competing for the selective consumers, such that :
(i) each rms price is randomly chosen from the c.d.f
Fm(p) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
0 if p < pmin
1  2
(m)2
h
km
p+   m (1  m)
i
if pmin 5 p 5 pmax   
2  2
(m)2
h
km
p    m (1  m)
i
if pmax    5 p < pmax
1 if p = pmax
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
(1)
with
pmax =
2km
m (2  m) +   v    and pmin = pmax   2; (2)
and
km =

2
(2  m)2 (1 + ) ; (3)
with  =
r
1 +

m
2 m
2
> 1:
(ii) Each rm chooses an advertising reach m 2 (0; 1) ; implicitly given by:
1
2
(pmax   ) (2  m) = A (m) : (4)
(iii) Each rm earns an overall expected prot of
Em = mA (
m) A (m) : (5)
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Proof.
See the Appendix.
Proposition 2 provides a characterization of the symmetric and interior MSNE for a general
specication of the advertising cost function A () ; with A > 0 and A  0:18 The interior
equilibrium in Proposition 2 has a few interesting features. To start, equilibrium decisions are
not directly a¤ected by the consumerswillingness to pay, v:19 This is a standard result in models
of uniform price competition with di¤erentiated products (e.g. Hotelling model). The following
Corollary discusses the impact of  and  on the equilibrium advertising intensity m; under
fairly general assumptions regarding the mass advertising cost function.
Corollary 1 For v > 2; the equilibrium mass advertising levels are increasing with the
brand awareness parameter . On the contrary, an increase in the marginal cost of advertising
A () leads to a reduction in m:
Proof. See the Appendix.
The second result in Corollary 1 is quite intuitive. As advertising becomes more expensive,
rms advertise less. The impact of the brand awareness parameter is less straightforward. When
 goes up (but remains su¢ ciently low to guarantee the inequality v > 2), consumers in the
weak market need a greater discount to be enticed to buy their least preferred good. When both
rms are competing for all consumers in both segments (as in Proposition 2), they try to o¤set
the negative price e¤ect just described by making more sales in the weak market, which requires
a greater investment in informative advertising, implying @
m
@ > 0.
It is worth noting that when both rms increase m; the set of selective consumers becomes
larger. Hence, not surprisingly, the maximum price in the support of the equilibrium price
distribution moves to the left when m goes up. In other words,
@pmax
@m
=  

2  m
m
2 ( + 1)
(m)2 + 2 (1  m) < 0:
Therefore, the e¤ect of  on the expected prot is a priori ambiguous. On the one hand,  has
a direct positive e¤ect on prices and prots (see (3)). On the other hand, it increases m; which
will have a negative e¤ect on average prices.
18Note that this equilibrium characterization does not cover the case of costless advertising, in which the
equilibrium woukd be m = 1. In that situation, the additional cost of doing an additional ad (zero) would
always be lower than the corresponding additional revenue 1
2
(pmax   ) (2 m) > 0 (since m  1 and pmax > 
as in equation (2)). When advertising is costless, the equilibrium prices would then range from pmin =
p
2 and
pmax =
 p
2 + 2

:
19Nonetheless, it is worth noting that v indirectly a¤ects rmsprot in a very important way since consumers
reservation price v plays a key role in the delimitation of the domain in which the results in Proposition 2 may
arise. This occurs both through the condition v > 2 (which determines rms incentives to induce or not full
market segmentation in equilibrium) and through the impact of v on the critical   value in Lemma 1.
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In order to obtain analytical insights and disentangle the e¤ects described above, we need to
specify the functional form of the advertising technology. In the remainder of the paper, we will
consider the quadratic advertising technology A() = 2. Besides the tractability advantages,
such functional form has been used in previous works (E.g. Brahim et al., 2011 or Galeotti
and Moraga-Gonzalez, 2008) and it allows us to directly compare the results of this paper with
the ones obtained by Esteves and Resende (2016) in a model of targeted advertising and price
discrimination.
In Lemma 2, we characterize the interior MSNE, with m < 1: Afterwards, Corollary 2 briey
describes the equilibrium outcomes in the corner solution with m = 1. It is worth noting that in
the last case, our model will reproduce the equilibrium outcomes obtained by Esteves (2010) in
a model with full information. Thus, we will concentrate on the interior equilibrium outcomes,
in which some consumers remain uninformed, thereby departing from the full information set-up
of Esteves (2010). In particular, in Lemma 2, we assume that the conditions (A1) and (A2) hold
in order to guarantee the existence of an interior MSNE in which both rms are competing for
selective consumers.20
Lemma 2. Let A() = 2 and assume
v 
p
2 + 3

 (A1)

 p
2 + 1

4
  <

v   
4

min

v   3
2
;
v
v   2

: (A2)
In the MSNE described in Proposition 2, each rm chooses an advertising reach m 2 (0; 1) ;
equal to
m =
2
 
2 + 8
1=2
(2 + 8)1=2 + 4
: (6)
The support of the distribution of equilibrium prices is such that:
pmax =
 
2 + 8
1=2
+  and pmin = pmax   2
and the cdf Fm (p) is equal to:
Fm (p) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
0 if p <
 
2 + 8
1=2   
4
h 
2 + 8
 1=2   1p+ i if  2 + 81=2     p   2 + 81=2
1  4
h
1
p   
 
2 + 8
 1=2i
if
 
2 + 8
1=2  p <  2 + 81=2 + 
1 if p   2 + 81=2 + 
(7)
Firms get an overall expected prot Em = A (m) =
4(2+8)h
(2+8)1=2+4
i2 :
20More precisely, the RHS inequality in condition (A2) guarantees that in equilibrium both rms compete for
all selective consumers, with pmax  v   . Condition (A1) and the LHS inequality of condition (A2) guarantee
an interior advertising equilibrium, with m < 1:
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Proof. See the Appendix.
Corollary 2. When 2 < v <
 p
2 + 3

 or when v >
 p
2 + 3

 and  <
(
p
2+1)
4 ;
all consumers are informed about the existence of both products (i.e. m = 1). In equilibrium,
the support of the rmsoptimal prices is
p
2;
 p
2 + 2



and rms obtain an expected prot
equal to km =
 
1
2
p
2 + 12

    > 0:
Proof. See the Appendix.
Corollary 2 shows that, when  is su¢ ciently low, in equilibrium all the consumers are
fully informed. As mentioned earlier, in this case we recover the results obtained by Esteves
(2010). Lemma 2 shows that new results may arise when rms need to invest in advertising
to generate consumersawareness. These new results depend on two key parameters:  and :
These parameters are related to two distinct sources of market power: product di¤erentiation
(through the brand awareness parameter, ) and the existence of a fraction of consumers who
remain uninformed about the existence of the rival product (as a result of rmsadvertising
decisions, which crucially depend on ). The following Corollary points out how equilibrium
prices are a¤ected by  and .
Corollary 3. The equilibrium expected price is increasing both with  and with ; with:
(i) @pmax@ =
4++
p
2+8p
2+8
> 0 and @pmin@ =
4+ 
p
2+8p
2+8
> 0;
(ii) @pmax@ = 4
p
2+8
> 0 and @(pmax pmin)@ = 0:
Proof. Follows directly from Lemma 2.
From Corollary 3 follows that equilibrium expected prots must be increasing with  and
.21 It is worth noting that when  increases, advertising is more expensive, which is of course
bad for prots (direct e¤ect). However, when  goes up, rms reduce the intensity of advertising
and the set of selective consumers is narrower. As a result, rms relax price competition (in
order to extract more surplus from captive consumers), leading to an increase in expected prices,
which obviously has a positive impact on prices (strategic e¤ect). The next Lemma shows that,
under conditions (A1) and (A2), the expected prots with mass advertising are increasing with
; meaning that the strategic e¤ect dominates the direct one (this result frequently arises in
models with informative advertising, e.g. Grossman and Shapiro, 1984, Sthal, 1994 or Esteves,
2009a).
Lemma 3. Under conditions (A1) and (A2), the equilibrium expected prot is increasing
with advertising costs, @E
m
@ > 0:
21Coming back to the discussion following Corollary 1, this allows us to conclude that, for the quadratic advertis-
ing technology, the positive direct e¤ect of  on prices and prots more than compensates its indirect negative e¤ect
on prices, as a result of the increase in the equilibrium advertising levels, @
m
@
= 8(4+)
162
p
2+8+8(8+)+(2+8)
3
2
> 0:
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Proof. See the Appendix.
Finally, in order to analyze the welfare properties of the equilibrium in which rms randomize
prices, we need to investigate whether selective consumers are buying e¢ ciently in equilibrium.
To this end, we need to compute the probability of rms sharing evenly the group of selective
consumers, so that each rm is serving the group of selective consumers in the corresponding
strong market.
Proposition 3. Each rm serves its group of strong selective customers with probability
q 2 [0; 1] which is equal to
q = 1 + 2
(  2)2
2
  8k
2
24
ln
 
(pmax   )2
pmax (pmax   2)
!
For the quadratic advertising technology this probability is equal to:
q = 1  322

1
2
ln
 
8
+ 1

  1
 (8+ )

Proof. See the Appendix.
3 Competitive e¤ects of customized ads and prices
3.1 Targeted advertising and price discrimination
This section analyzes the competitive e¤ects generated by the combination of price discrimi-
nation and targeted advertising (personalized communication). We compare the equilibrium
outcomes obtained in the previous section (in which rms choose an advertising intensity, m;
and the corresponding price, p; to the whole market) to the equilibrium outcomes described
by Esteves and Resende (2016) in a model of targeted advertising and personalized pricing.
Before moving to this comparison, we briey recall some modelling options and some results
obtained in Esteves and Resende (2016). They consider that rms may choose di¤erent adver-
tising intensities to be targeted to the strong and to the weak market segments (oi and 
r
i ;
respectively).22 They may also choose di¤erent prices to each market segment (poi ; p
r
i ). The
advertising technology is additive separable, with A (oi ; 
r
i ) =  (
o
i )
2 +  (ri )
2 :
The next Remark reproduces the results in Esteves and Resende (2016) when rms use
a quadratic advertising technology, A (oi ; 
r
i ) =  (
o
i )
2 +  (ri )
2 : As already mentioned, we
are focusing our attention on the domain in which both rms have incentives to serve all the
consumers, regardless of the market segment they belong (in other words, unless explicitly
mentioned, we will assume that the conditions (A1) and (A2) resulting from Proposition 1 and
Lemma 1 hold). Accordingly, we will restrain our attention to the results of Esteves and Resende
(2016) for the case where v is su¢ ciently high:
22 In their notation, the advertising intensity oi represents rm i
0s advertising intensity in its own strong market,
whereas the r in ri stands for rm i
0s advertising intentity in the rivals strong market (i.e. rm is weak market).
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Remark 1. Let v  2 and consider a quadratic target advertising technology. There is a
symmetric Nash equilibrium in which
o =
v
4+ 2 (v   ) (8)
r =
8<:
v 
4
v+4 2
2v+4 2 if   v 8
q
5v 9
v    1

1 if  < v 8
q
5v 9
v    1
 (9)
Regarding the pricing decisions, for 0 < k < 1; k = o; r; in the strong market each rm i;
i = A;B chooses a price randomly from the distribution F o(p)
F o(p) =
8><>:
0 if p  prjmin + 
22+v v   (v   ) v+4 2v(p ) if prjmin +   p  v
1 if p  v
; (10)
with prmin =
1
2 (v   ) v+4 2v+2  : In the weak market, each rm chooses a price randomly from the
distribution F r (p) given by
F r(p) =
8>><>>:
0 if p  prjmin
4
2(v+2 ) v v+4 
p+
(v )(v+4 2) if p
r
jmin  p  v   
1 if p  v   
: (11)
F r(p) has a mass point at v    with a density equal to:
mr = 1  
o
r

v   
v

=
v   2
v   2 + 4 (12)
The expected prot (considering both segments) is equal to:
Et =

2+ v   
2

A (o) +A (r)
Proof. See the Proof of Proposition 1 in Esteves and Resende (2016) and let A (oi ; 
r
i ) =
 (oi )
2 +  (ri )
2.
It is important to stress that Esteves and Resende (2016) did not present any insights on
the welfare results in their model. Thus, in order to look at the welfare e¤ects of personalized
pricing through targeted ads, we rst need to compute consumer surplus and overall welfare in
the model of Esteves and Resende (2016). Therefore, we need to identify what is the probability
that selective consumers buy their favorite product in equilibrium. Later on, this will allow us
to account for the welfare e¤ects of ine¢ cient shopping by selective consumers.
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Proposition 4 With perfect targeting and price discrimination, each rm wins the group
of selective customers in its own market with a probability equal to z 2 [0; 1] where
z =

v   
2vr

pomin

 + v

ln
(v   ) pomin
vprmin

o   1
o

+mr
For the quadratic technology, this probability is equal to:
z =
4+ 

  4

ln
v + 4  
v + 4  2

v + 4  
2
: (13)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Note that the relationship between the probabilities z (in Proposition 4) and q (in Proposition
3) is not straightforward. In the following gure, the dashed line illustrates the value of the
probability q; for di¤erent advertising costs (and we set  = 1). Note that in the case of mass
advertising, q is independent of v: The other functions display z as a function of the advertising
cost ; for di¤erent values of v: The lines are depicted for  = 1 and v = f5; 7; 10; 100g ; with the
probability of serving the selective consumers in the strong market being increasing with v: The
gure suggests that for su¢ ciently high v and su¢ ciently high ; the probability that selective
consumers buy e¢ ciently is higher under uniform pricing than under price discrimination. It
also suggests that q is less responsive to the advertising cost  than z. With personalized pricing
through targeted ads, when  is goes down, oi will increase. As a result, the set of potential
who are potentially captive to the rival (weak) rm becomes narrower, which intensies price
competition. Firm i becomes more likely to win in its turf, i.e. z goes up when  goes down.23
0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.8
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q
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z (v=5)
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Fig 1. Prob serving selective consumers in strong market
3.2 Price e¤ects
This section characterizes the price e¤ects of personalized pricing with targeted ads. Proposi-
tion 5 shows that, under conditions (A1) and (A2), personalized price o¤ers result into higher
expected prices in both market segments. This is an interesting result because it challenges the
23Since this strategic e¤ect does not arise in the model with mass advertising, we get that q is less responsive
to  than z:
16
usual nding that price discrimination in a competitive setting generally intensies competition
and reduces the prices to all segments of the market (see Thisse and Vives, 1988 or Fudenberg
and Tirole, 2000, among many others). This result gives support to concerns that have been
raised regarding the rmsability to use data about consumers to adopt personalized pricing
strategies and charge them higher prices.24
An important contribution of our analysis is to highlight that we should be cautious about
proposals to regulate personalized pricing. Indeed, the presumption that markets are com-
petitive is not a su¢ cient condition to avoid regulation. While under some market features
competitive price discrimination might intensify competition and benet consumers; the reverse
might happen in other cases.
The rationale for this result lies on rmsability to take advantage of the interplay between
informative targeted ads and personalized prices. Esteves and Resende (2016) have already
shown that, for v  2 and  < v 4 v 32 ,25 rms strategically reduce the intensity of advertising
targeted to the strong market (vis-à-vis the weak market) as a way to induce the rival to play
less aggressively and sustain higher prices. Proposition 5 shows that the combination between
personalized prices and targeted ads indeed leads to higher expected prices in both segments of
the market because in the mass communication set-up, rms are no longer able to strategically
use targeted ads to favorably segment the market in order to soften price competition).
Proposition 5. Comparing equilibrium pricing behavior under uniform versus personalized
pricing, we nd that:
(i) pmin  prmin and pmax  prmin
(ii) F r rst-order stochastically dominates Fm; with Fm (p) > F r (p) :
(iii) F o rst-order stochastically dominates Fm; with Fm (p) > F o (p) :
(iv) The expected price with uniform pricing is below the expected prices with personalized
pricing in both market segments, i.e., E (pm) < E (po) and E (po) < E (pr) :
Proof. See the Appendix.
The results in Proposition 5 are illustrated in the following gures, in which the stochastic
dominance of F r over Fm and the stochastic dominance of F o over Fm is quite clear. The
gures are drawn for  = 1 and v = 7: In Figure 2, we have  = 2; whereas in Figure 3. we have
 = 1; given that for v = 7 and  = 1; Assumption (A2) implies 0:60355    min f2:1; 3g
24See https://verdict.justia.com/2015/05/13/personalized-pricing-in-the-air-why-consumers-should-be-wary-
of-a-new-airline-pricing-proposal [Accessed online 19 August 2016]
25This region of parameters includes our domain dened by conditions (A1) and (A2)
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The gures also show that the dominance established in parts (ii) and (iii) of Proposition
5 appears to become more signicant when  is low. Indeed, when advertising costs go down
( goes down), pmax and pmin go down by the same amount (recall that price dispersion is
independent of ; since pmax   pmin = 2): In a set-up with non-customized ads, average prices
are necessarily lower when  goes down. When rms target both ads and prices simultaneously,
the reduction in  translates into a reduction of the minimum price in the support of the
cdf distribution and price dispersion is greater because the maximum price in the distribution
remains unchanged (recall that prmax = v    and pomax = v; meaning that the highest price in
each segment is independent of the advertising cost ). Consequently, when  goes down, the
stochastic dominance of F r (and F o) over Fm becomes more signicant. This is also the case,
when v goes up. As mentioned in Section 2, the distribution of prices under mass advertising is
independent of v;26 whereas under targeted advertising and price discrimination, an increase in
v moves both F r and F o to the right.
3.3 Advertising e¤ects
Let us now focus on the e¤ects of targeted ads (with personalized price o¤ers) on rmsoptimal
advertising decisions. It turns out that the comparison of equilibrium advertising intensities un-
der mass and targeted advertising is rather complex. Although the quadratic cost specication
favors higher advertising rates in a scenario of targeted advertising than in a scenario of mass
advertising,27 the interplay between advertising and prices makes the comparison between m
and (r; o) much more intricate. The gures below present two di¤erent congurations of equi-
26 In the mass communication model (as in other models of price competition between di¤erentiatied products,
such as the Hotelling model), rmsprotability only depends on the degree of product di¤erentiation,  The
consumerswillingness to pay does not a¤ect prots since price competition among the rms will dissipate any
rents they could possibly get when, ceteris paribus, consumersreservation price v goes up (for the same ).
27Note that similar advertising additive separable cost specications have been used in previous literature
dealing with targeted advertising, namely Galeotti and Moraga-Gonzalez (2008) and Brahim et al. (2011).
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librium market segmentation.28 When v is su¢ ciently low (see Figure 4), we get m > r > o:
Everything else the same, when v gets larger, rms advertise more under customized information
(namely in the weak market), whereas the equilibrium advertising level under mass communi-
cation remains unchanged (recall that m is independent of v). Accordingly, as illustrated in
Figure 5, for su¢ ciently large values of v; we obtain that r > m (see Lemma 4). For large
v   values, the comparison between m and o depends on the value of  (see Lemma 5). We
get r > m > o; provided advertising costs are su¢ ciently low. Di¤erently, when both v and
 are large enough, we obtain r > o > m. For high v and low ; we obtain r > m > o
(see Figure 5).
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 = 1)
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Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 below provide further details on the relationship between m; o
and r:
Lemma 4. Firms advertise more intensively in the weak market under a targeting strategy
than under a mass strategy, r > m; when
4 (v   ) (v + 4  2) +
p
2 + 8 ((v   ) (v + 4  2)  16 (v + 2  )) < 0: (14)
Accordingly:
(i) If v is high enough, i.e., if
v > 6+
3
2
 +
1
2
q
2722 + 24 + 2; (15)
it is always true that r > m:
(ii) On the contrary, when v is small enough, v < (
3
p
2+
p
6 2)
2(
p
2 1) = 5:6639; each rm adver-
tises more with mass advertising than with targeted advertising in both market segments. In this
case, it follows that m > r > o:
28Figure 4 depicts optimal advertising levels as a function of ; for  = 1 and v = 5: We consider 0:65 <  < 1;
which corresponds to the domain dened by conditions (A1) and (A2) for v = 5 and  = 1: The thin line depcits
o; the dashed line represents r and the thick line represents m; with m > r > o; 8: Figure 5 is drawn for
a high value of v; with v = 100 and  = 1; implying 0:603 55 <  < 25: 255:
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Proof. See the Appendix.
Lemma 4 points that a su¢ ciently high value of v constitutes a su¢ cient condition to have
r > m in (i) and r < m in (ii). For other v   values, the comparison between r and o
depends on : It is worth noting that the critical v threshold in (15) is increasing in : This
suggests that it becomes easier to obtain r > m when advertising costs are su¢ ciently low
(this is in line with the ndings of Esteves and Resende (2016) who argue that rmsincentives
to adopt aggressive targeted advertising strategies arise for low advertising costs).
Lemma 5. The fraction of consumers who receive informative ads about their favorite
product is higher under mass advertising than under target advertising, m > o when:
(i) regardless of the value of v; the advertising cost is su¢ ciently small, i.e.,
 <
3
4

p
10 + 3

= 4:621 7; or
(ii) the advertising cost is high,  > 34
 p
10 + 3

but v is not too large, with:
v < 4 (2  ) 3 (8+ ) + 4
p
2 + 8 
162   9 (8+ ) :
Proof. See the Appendix.
From Lemma 4 and Lemma 5, we conclude that it is not possible to make unambiguous pre-
dictions regarding the features of equilibrium market segmentation under mass versus targeted
advertising strategies. According to part (i) in Lemma 4, when v is su¢ ciently low (resulting in
m > r > o) there will necessarily be more informed (and more selective) consumers under
mass than under personalized communication. We will see later that in this domain, the use
of targeted advertising messages (with personalized price o¤ers) may indeed be welfare detri-
mental, specially to consumers. On the one hand, the combination between personalized pricing
and targeted ads allows rms to relax price competition, resulting in higher prices in both seg-
ments of the market vis-à-vis the benchmark with uniform pricing and mass advertising. On
the other hand, more consumers remain uninformed (and out of the market) under customized
than under mass information, meaning that there is less e¢ cient shopping in the former case
(since the set of selective consumers is narrower with customized than with mass information;
and the probability q is above z; as illustrated in Figure 1). This nding is in contrast with
Brahim et al. (2011) in which targeted advertising always leads to a more e¢ cient shopping for
all consumers.
In other sub-domains, equilibrium market segmentation may have di¤erent features. For
example, when v and  are su¢ ciently large, we obtain r > o > m; so that both the fraction
of informed and the fraction of selective consumers are larger under a targeted advertising
20
strategy than under a mass advertising one. However, it is important to stress that this does
not necessarily mean that targeted advertising is welfare-enhancing because: (i) more consumers
are captive to the least preferred rm than to the favorite one; and (ii) the expected prices are
greater under targeted advertising than under mass advertising (see Proposition 5).
3.4 Prot e¤ects
Let us now analyze how price discrimination through targeted advertising a¤ects the rms
equilibrium prots. Under conditions (A1) and (A2), we have Et =

2+v 
2

A (o)+A (r)
and Em = mA (m) A (m) : Therefore, we can established the following proposition.
Proposition 6. The combination of targeted advertising and price discrimination boosts
each rms prots when  is such that the following implicit condition is satised
2 (1   (; v; )) + (v   ) > 0; with  (; v; ) = (
m)2   (r)2
(o)2
:
Proof. See the Appendix.
Proposition 6 highlights that in comparison to mass advertising and uniform pricing, ex-
pected prots may be higher when rms employ a strategy of targeted advertising with person-
alized pricing o¤ers. The magnitude of consumerswillingness to pay (v) plays a key role in this
comparison. While expected prots under personalized pricing through targeted advertising are
increasing with v; the expected prots with mass information are independent of v. Provided
v is su¢ ciently large we nd that Et > Em because price discrimination allows rms to set
larger prices in their strong turf.
Accordingly, price discrimination by means of targeted advertising does not necessarily lead
to the classic prisoner dilemma result that generally arises in models with fully informed con-
sumers. In the literature, price discrimination is in general bad for prots in models with: (i)
fully informed consumers, (ii) best-response asymmetry and (iii) all rms engaging in price dis-
crimination (e.g. Thisse and Vives, 1988; Chen, 1997; Villas-Boas, 1999; Fudenberg and Tirole,
2000, Esteves, 2010; Gehrig, et al., 2012). Our analysis suggests that the interplay between
targeted advertising and price discrimination may actually boost industry prots even when
conditions (ii) and (iii) hold.
Figure 6 plots each rms expected prots with price discrimination through targeted adver-
tising (Prot_T) and the prots with mass advertising (Prot_M) for  = 1 and for di¤erent
values of v; (respectively, v = 3 +
p
2; 5; 7): The gure illustrates the results in Proposition 6,
showing that Et (dashed lines) can only be below Em for su¢ ciently low values of v.29
When v is small enough (provided conditions (A1) and (A2) hold), we get Et > Em only
when advertising costs are su¢ ciently low. Indeed, for low values of , Esteves and Resende
29As v gets larger, prots will be always greater with target than with mass communication. The case v = 7 in
Figure 6 illustrates this type of outcome: as v goes up, Et will move upwards, whereas Em remains unchanged.
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(2016) argue that rms are able to strategically choose advertising in order to relax the intensity
of price competition. On the contrary, we nd that under mass communication, price competi-
tion is very intense (recall that in Section 2, price competition intensies as  goes down, leading
to lower expected prot):
0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0
0.0
0.5
1.0
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2.0
Advertising cost
Profit
Profit_T (v=3+sqr(2))
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Profit_T (v=7)
Profit_M
Fig 6. Prots
4 Welfare analysis
This section investigates the welfare e¤ects of combining targeted advertising and price dis-
crimination in comparison to mass advertising and uniform pricing. We start by presenting the
welfare functions for both advertising/pricing strategies considered, namely mass advertising/no
discrimination and targeted advertising/personalized prices.
Consider rst the mass advertising and uniform pricing case. Recall that customersgross
benet when buying a certain good can be given by v expected disutility cost, where the latter
is equal to ; when the consumer buys the least preferred good; and zero, when the consumer
buys the most preferred good. In the social optimal solution with full information, consumers
would buy from the most preferred rm, in order to obtain a gross benet of v (and minimize
the expected disutility cost). We obtain that rmscaptive consumers in their strong market
always buy e¢ ciently. In contrast, captive consumers who are only aware of the least preferred
product always buy ine¢ ciently (incurring the disutility cost ): Finally, selective consumers buy
e¢ ciently when rms share them equally, which occurs with probability q: With the remaining
probability, 1   q; all the selective consumers buy from the same rm, which means that half
of them buy ine¢ ciently. Accordingly, in the case of mass advertising/no discrimination, total
expected equilibrium welfare can be represented as:
EWm = m (1  m) (2v   ) + v (m)2   
2
(1  q) (m)2   2A(m) (16)
where m is evaluated at the equilibrium value obtained in section 2. The quadratic advertising
technology yields:
EWm = 2
4  
(4+ )2
(2v   ) +

v   2 

162

ln
 + 8
8
  16
2
(8+ )

2
 + 4
2
; (17)
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with  =
p
2 + 8: The expected consumer surplus, denoted by ECSm is simply ECSm =
EWm   Emind, where Emind stand for industry prots. The quadratic advertising technology
yields Em = A (m) ; implying Emind = 2A (
m) and ECSm = EWm   2 (m)2 :
As mentioned before, Esteves and Resende (2016) do not provide a welfare analysis. There-
fore, we need to compute the welfare functions for the case where rms engage in targeted
advertising and price discrimination. In their model, the selective consumers in each market
segment will buy e¢ ciently when each rm wins the group of selective consumers in its strong
market, which in this case occurs with probability z. Regarding captive consumers, those who
buy the most preferred product obtain a gross utility of v; while those consumers who are only
aware of the less preferred product obtain a gross utility of v   : Accordingly, overall welfare
with targeted advertising and price discrimination, denoted by EW t is equal to:
vo (1  r)+ (v   )r (1  o)+or

vz+
v (1  z)
2
+
(v   ) (1  z)
2

 2A (o) 2A (r) ;
which simplies to:
EW t= vo+(v   )r (1  o)  (1  z) 
or
2
 2A (o) 2A (r) ;
where o and r are given by (8) and (9), respectively. For the quadratic advertising technology,
we have:
EW t =
8<:
1
2
v2
(v+2 )2 (v +   ) +
1
32 (v   )2 (v+4 2)
2
(v+2 )2
 18v (v   ) v+4 2(v+2 )2

ln v+4 v+4 2

v+4 
   1
 9=; : (18)
Let ECSt represent expected consumer surplus with targeted advertising and prices. It
follows that ECSt =W t   Etind: The quadratic advertising technology yields:
ECSt = v
v   
(v + 2  )2

v
4
  v + 4  2
8

ln

v + 4  
v + 4  2

(v + 4  )  

(19)
The comparison of welfare outcomes under mass and targeted advertising strategies is quite
intricate due to the complexity of the expressions obtained in (17) and (18). Although we are
able to dene the condition on parameters ;  and v; for which targeted advertising and prices
is welfare improving by imposing W t > Wm; with W t given by (18) and Wm given by (17), it is
not possible to nd the close-form solution to the previous inequality. Nevertheless, the following
gures allow us to shed some light on the welfare implications of price discrimination through
targeted ads (in comparison to the benchmark of mass advertising with uniform pricing).
Figures 7 and 8 represent W t (dashed lines) and Wm (solid lines) as a function of the cost
of advertising, .30 We set  = 1 and we consider di¤erent values of v, respectively a low value
(v = 7) in Figure 7; and a high value (v = 100) in Figure 8.
Comparing the two gures, it is possible to conclude that moving from a strategy of mass
advertising/no discrimination to a strategy of targeted advertising and personalized price o¤ers
30 In all the gures, the domain of  is represented such that: (i) conditions (A1) and (A2) hold; (ii) r < 1):
In the case of v = 7;  = 1; these conditions imply 0:81    2:1: In the case of v = 100;  = 1; we get
15:18    25:26:
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might be welfare improving or not, depending on the domain of the parameters under consider-
ation. The gures suggest that targeted advertising/price discrimination is welfare detrimental
when v is su¢ ciently low. Specically, gure 7 shows that when v = 7; we always haveW t < Wm:
The rationale behind this result is related to the strategic e¤ects entailed by the interplay be-
tween targeted ads and prices. When rms are able to targeted specic market segments, they
will strategically reduce advertising levels (at least in the strong market) to sustain higher prices.
As a result, targeted information generates two detrimental e¤ects: (i) there are less informed
consumers (and less selective consumers) in this case than under mass communication; (ii) more
selective consumers may end up buying ine¢ ciently than under mass communication.
As v increases, we nd that under targeted advertising and price discrimination rms have
less incentives to leave consumers uninformed. Thus, for su¢ ciently high values of v; the set of
informed consumers (and selective consumers) is larger under targeted advertising than under
mass advertising. This e¤ect has a positive impact on welfare. Figure 8 shows that, when
v = 100; W t > Wm for all values of : In this gure we are considering a v   value that is
su¢ ciently high to guarantee that r > o > m. In this scenario, some consumers who receive
targeted ads, would not be informed about the products in the mass communication set-up (and
therefore they would be excluded from the market).
Advertising cost
EW
W_m
W_t
Fig7. Welfare for low v
Advertising cost
EW
W_m
W_t
Fig 8. Welfare for high v
Look next at the e¤ect of targeted advertising and pricing on consumer welfare. It is im-
portant to stress that the condition W t > Wm does not not necessarily mean that consumers
overall benet from customized information since expected prices are higher with personalized
pricing than with uniform pricing. Indeed, Figure 9 plotted for  = 1 shows that when v is high
(v = 100) even when we have W t > Wm, due to the reasons described above, regardless of ;
consumers are overall worse o¤ since ECSm > ECSt:
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Fig 9. Cons. Surplus for high
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The comparison between Figures 8 and 9 shows that rms can indeed take advantage of price
discrimination through targeted ads, because they may be able to increase their prots (see also
Figure 6) at the expense of consumer welfare.
From a theoretical point of view, we cannot make general predictions on the welfare e¤ects
of price discrimination through targeted advertising. This suggest that who wins or who loses
when rms depart from a mass advertising/pricing strategy to a targeted one might depend
on the features of the market under consideration (e.g., level of advertising costs, consumer
willingness to pay, brand preferences). Therefore, this constitutes an empirical matter and it is
important to take into consideration specic market features when assessing the welfare e¤ects
of customized communication between rms and consumers.
Our numerical analysis suggests that a personalized advertising/pricing strategy will be
welfare detrimental when v is low, while it shall have a positive welfare e¤ect when v is high.
However, it is worth noting that such welfare increase may only benet rms (who get higher
prots). Consumers may end up being worse-o¤ both because they are paying a higher price for
the product and a considerable fraction of them is buying ine¢ ciently.
In light of these ndings, our paper highlights the importance of ongoing scrutiny of markets
in which rms have the tools to send personalized ads and personalized price o¤ers to their
consumers (e.g. online markets or markets in which rms use mobile apps to send personalized
messages to consumers and control their consumption features, such as location or past con-
sumption history). Our analysis suggests that the combination of personalized ads and prices
may be welfare detrimental, especially for consumers. According to our results, this outcome is
more likely in markets with (i) low advertising costs (which is actually frequent in the case of
online advertising); and (ii) relatively high degree of product di¤erentiation, implying  is high
in relation to v:
Finally, since our analysis shows that price discrimination through targeted advertising might
boost industry prots at the expense of consumer welfare, an important implication for compe-
tition policy is that the decision of allowing or not rms to quote personalized prices through
targeted ads should be sensitive to the welfare criterion under consideration. If total welfare is
the criterion adopted by the competition authorities to evaluate these business practices then
targeted advertising and price discrimination should not be blocked as long as W t > Wm: If
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consumer surplus is instead the competition authority welfare standard, as it is the case in most
antitrust jurisdictions, then W t > Wm is not a su¢ cient condition to allow rms to engage
in targeted ads and prices. In this case competition authorities should take into account that
consumers might all pay higher prices under targeted advertising and price discrimination which
might lead to ECSt < ECSm even when W t > Wm.
5 Conclusions
This paper has investigated the e¤ects of the combination of personalized pricing and targeted
(informative) advertising in a competitive set-up. We have built on the model of Esteves and
Resende (2016) who study optimal pricing and advertising strategies when rms use a targeted
advertising technology that allows them to send di¤erent price o¤ers to each market segment. We
compared their pricing and advertising equilibrium with the one that would arise in a benchmark
model with mass advertising and uniform pricing (in which rms are unable to send personalized
content and therefore they do not have any tool to engage in price discrimination).
We nd that price discrimination through targeted advertising actually leads to higher ex-
pected prices in both segments of the market since each rm will strategically reduce advertising
in its strong market as an attempt to invite the rival to price less aggressively in this segment.
This is an interesting nding as it challenges the usual result that price discrimination reduces all
segment prices. In light of this strategic e¤ect, we obtain that price discrimination by means of
targeted informative advertising does not necessarily lead to the classic prisoner dilemma result
arising in models with full informed consumers and exhibiting best-response asymmetry (Thisse
and Vives, 1988 and the subsequent literature). When advertising is not too expensive, each
rmsprot with targeted advertising and price discrimination is above its non-discrimination
counterpart, even when v is low.
In what concerns equilibrium market segmentation, we nd that it is not possible to establish
general predictions regarding the relative size of the set of informed and selective consumers with
mass and targeted advertising. We nd that for su¢ ciently small (large) v   values; there will
be more (less) informed and selective consumers with mass than with customized advertising
messages. Interestingly, in contrast with previous literature (e.g. Brahim et al., 2011), we nd
that targeted advertising combined with price discrimination does not always lead to a more
e¢ cient shopping for all consumers. The justication is two-folded. First, when rms run
customized ads, rms will strategically advertise more intensively in the weak market than in
the strong market, which means that more consumers will be captive to their least preferred
product, buying ine¢ ciently. Second, expected prices are higher under targeted information
than under mass communication.
Finally, we have shed some light on the welfare e¤ects of price discrimination through person-
alized ads. We have rst characterized the equilibrium welfare outcomes in the set-up proposed
by Esteves and Resende (2016), whose analysis neglected welfare issues. Then, we compared
those outcomes to the ones arising in the model with mass advertising and uniform pricing.
We nd that this welfare comparison is quite intricate and it constitutes a relevant empirical
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question, since targeted-advertising may be welfare improving or not, depending on the features
of the market in which rms participate (namely in what concerns the consumerswillingness
to pay, v; the brand preference parameter,  and the advertising cost ). Our analysis reveals
that personalized pricing/ ads will be welfare detrimental when v is low, while they shall have
a positive welfare e¤ect when v is high. However, it is worth noting that such welfare increase
may only benet rms (who get higher prots). Consumers may end up being worse-o¤ both
because they are paying a higher price for the product and a considerable fraction of them is
buying ine¢ ciently.
In light of these ndings, our paper highlights the importance of ongoing scrutiny of markets
in which rms have the tools to send personalized ads and personalized price o¤ers to their
consumers (e.g. online markets or markets in which rms use mobile apps to send personalized
messages to consumers and control their consumption features, such as location or past con-
sumption history). Our analysis suggests that the combination of personalized ads and prices
may be welfare detrimental, especially for consumers. According to our results, this outcome is
more likely in markets with (i) low advertising costs (which is actually frequent in the case of
online advertising); and (ii) relatively high degree of product di¤erentiation, implying  is high
in relation to v:
From a public policy perspective, our ndings suggest that the assessment of welfare e¤ects
of price discrimination must take into consideration other forms of competition besides prices
(e.g. personalized ads). Otherwise, we might be missing some important welfare e¤ects resulting
from the interplay between rmsdi¤erent actions (like the interplay between targeted ads and
prices occurring in the present paper).
The model addressed in this paper tried to o¤er a closer approximation of reality where the
quantity and quality of consumer-specic information that rms have been using to implement
their advertising and pricing strategies is increasingly improving thanks to the advances in
information technologies. However, the model is obviously far from covering all complex aspects
of real markets and more research is needed to have a better picture on the welfare e¤ects
of rms personalized strategies in online markets. In our future research, we would like to
address other important aspects of these markets such as the issues related to consumer search
behavior, privacy concerns or the business strategy of intermediary advertising platforms and
big data companies.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Look rst at case (i). Suppose (pi; pj) equal to (v; v) is an
equilibrium in pure strategies. In this case rm i serves only the captive and the selective
consumers who belong to its strong market, obtaining a prot equal to (v;v) =
1
2vi 2i : The
optimal advertising level is equal to i =
v
4 ; corresponding to the advertising intensity that
maximizes (v;v):When
4 > v (20)
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we have an interior solution, with m = v4 . For lower advertising costs, we would have a corner
solution with m = 1:
In the interior solution, rmsequilibrium prot is equal to (vi )
 = 116
v2
 : Any price greater
than v is not part of an equilibrium strategy since at such a price no consumer is willing to buy
from the rm. Any price lower than v but greater than v  gives rm i the same market share
but reduces its prot and so it is dominated by v: If rm i deviates and chooses pdi = v  ; the
rm starts selling its good to captive consumers in its weak market, obtaining a prot equal to:
d;v i = (v   )

i
 
1  j

+
1
2
ij

  2i ;
where j =
1
4
v
 ; since rm i takes as given rm j
0 s decisions (pricing and advertising). The
deviation advertising reach would then be equal to d;v i =
1
16
(v )(8 v)
2
with d;v i > 0;
under (20). The condition  > (v 4)
2
v 8 would guarantee 
d;v 
i < 1. For v < 8; the RHS of the
last condition is always negative and therefore the condition is always true. Firm i0s deviation
prot is therefore equal to d;v i =
1


(v )(v 8)
16
2
. Comparing d;v i and (
v
i )
 ; we obtain
the following no-deviation condition:
   

2563
> 0; (21)
with   = (v (v   ) + 4 (2   3v)) and 
 = (v (v   )  4 (v   2)) : For  < v < 2; we have

 > 0. In that case, the non-deviation condition (21) requires   < 0, or, equivalently,
 >
v
4
v   
3v   2 ; (22)
which is always true under condition (20).
When v > 2 and  < v(v )4(v 2) ; we still have 
 > 0. In that case, condition (22) remains
necessary to preclude deviations from v to v : Thus, the following no-deviation condition (for
v > 2) must hold:
v
4
<  <
v (v   )
4 (v   2) ;
which is a non-empty interval. Finally, for v > 2 and  > v(v )4(v 2) ; we have 
 < 0: In that
case, the non-deviation condition (21) requires   > 0; or equivalently,  < v(v )4(3v 2) ; which is
incompatible with  > v(v )4(v 2) since
v(v )
4(v 2) >
v(v )
4(3v 2) :
Summing up, rm i will not have incentives to deviate from v to v   if (i)  < v  2; and
 > v4 >
v
4
(v )
(3v 2) ;or (ii) v > 2 and
v
4 <  <
v(v )
4(v 2) :
Now, it remains to study if instead of deviating to v   ; rm i would be interested in
decreasing its price even further in order to poach selective consumers in the weak market, with
pi = v      " > 0: In that case, rm i0s prots are equal to (v      ")i   2i , leading rm i
to choose an advertising intensity equal to v  "2 as long as  >
v  "
2 :
The deviation prots are equal to d;v  "i =
1
4
(v  ")2
 : Comparing this prot with the
equilibrium prot (vi )
 = 116
v2
 , it is easy to see that for v > 2; it is always possible to nd
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a su¢ ciently small " for which d;v  "i > (
v
i )
 ; which means that the deviation from v to
v      " is always protable when v > 2: When v < 2; such deviation is never protable.
Considering both types of deviation (to v    and to v      "); it is possible to conclude
that p = v and m is an interior Nash Equilibrium in pure strategies i¤ v < 2 and 4 > v;
which proves case (i) in Proposition 1.
Let us now address case (ii). Suppose (p; p) equal to (v   ; v   ) is an equilibrium in
pure strategies. In this case, rm i serves all its captive consumers as well as the selective
consumers in its strong market. Firm i0s prot for a given advertising intensity i write as
(v   )

i   ij2

  2i , and rmsequilibrium advertising reach is then given by mp=v  =
2 v v +4 ;provided that advertising costs are su¢ ciently low (so that rms do not choose to
inform all consumers in the market), i.e.:
4 > v   : (23)
The equilibrium prots are (v i )
 = 4 (v )
2
(v+4 )2 : If rm i deviates to a higher price it
must be to price v: In this case, rm i only sells to consumers in its strong market (captive
and selective). Deviation prots are given by 12vi   2i and the deviation advertising reach
is equal to v4 ; which is an interior solution when (20) holds. Deviation prots are equal to
(d;vi )
 = 116
v2
 :
Firm i does not have incentives to deviate to price v if (d;vi )
 < (v i )
; or equivalently,
(d;vi )
   (v i ) < 0,


16 (v + 4  )2 < 0
with  = (12v   8)+  v2   v > 0 and 
 = (v (v   )  4 (v   2)) : We have seen before
that 
 > 0 for  < v < 2 or v > 2 and  < v(v )4(v 2) : Therefore, in that region of parameters
the rm has incentives to deviate to a higher price v: On the contrary, when v > 2 and
 > v 4
v
v 2 >
v 
4 ; the rm prefers to set the price v    instead of v:
Let us consider next a deviation to a lower price. When rm i deviates to pdi = v 2 " (with
pdi > 0 for v > 2); it sells to all the consumers that are informed about its product (including
the group of selective consumers that belongs to its weak market). In this case, rm i0s deviation
prot writes as (v   2   ")i   2i , and rm is deviation advertising reach is then given by
d;v 2 "i =
v 2 "
2 : Deviation prots in this scenario are equal to 
d;v 2 "
i =
(v 2 ")2
4 :
This deviation is unprotable if
d;v 2 "i   (v i ) < 0,
#&
4 (v + 4  )2 < 0; (24)
with # = ((v   2) (v   )  4) and & = 4 (2v   3)+(v   2) (v   ) > 0; for v > 2: Condi-
tion (24) is equivalent to # < 0; i.e. 4 > (v 2)(v ) : Therefore, the pair of prices (v   ; v   )
and the corresponding advertising level 2 v v +4 are a PSNE i¤ rms do not have incentives to
increase nor decrease their prices, which requires v  2 and 4 > (v   )max
n
v
v 2 ;
v 2

o
:
This proves part (ii) in Proposition 1.
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Proof of Lemma 1. Part (ii) in Proposition 1 shows that the game has an interior PSNE
for v > 2 and 4  (v   )max
n
v
v 2 ;
v 2

o
: Thus, in order to show that the game has no
symmetric PSNE, it remains to check that the game has no corner PSNE in which all consumers
are informed about the existence of the product and rms set a price equal to v   : Suppose
(m) = 1 and pi = pj = v   : In this case, all consumers are selective and the equilibrium
would exhibit full market segmentation, with rms serving consumers in the respective strong
market only, getting prots equal to v 2   :
This could never be an equilibrium: under full information, each rm would be better o¤ it
charged a price v; as this would keep the level of sales unchanged but the rm would extract
more prot from each customer.
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose that rm j selects a price randomly from the c.d.f
Fj(p): Suppose further that the support of the equilibrium prices is [pmin; pmax]. When rm i
chooses any price that belongs to the equilibrium support of prices, and rm j uses the c.d.f
Fj(p); rm is expected equilibrium prot does not depend on the price and it is always equal
to a constant km minus advertising costs. More precisely, for pi  v   ; in a MSNE we must
have:
pi

i
 
1  j

+ ij

1  1
2
Fj (pi + )  1
2
Fj(pi   )

 A (i) = km  A (i)()(25)
Fj (pi + ) + Fj(pi   ) = 2  2k
m
ijpi
+
2
 
1  j

j
(26)
Suppose that p1 is such that p1    = pmin and p2 is such that p2 +  = pmax: Then, 8p  p1;
F (p  ) = 0 and 8p  p2; F (p+ ) = 1. Using (25) it follows that 8p  p1 ) Fj (pi + ) =
2   2kmijpi +
2(1 j)
j
and 8p  p2 ) Fj(pi   ) = 1   2kmijpi +
2(1 j)
j
: Thus, in a symmetric
MSNE with Fi (p) = Fj (p) = F (p) ; we have 8p  p1 ) F (p) = 2   2kmij(p ) +
2(1 j)
j
and
8p  p2 ) F (p) = 1  2kmij(p+) +
2(1 j)
j
:
Now it remains to show that p1 = p2: Suppose rst that p2 < p1: Then, 8p 2 [p2; p1] it follows
F (p  ) = 0 and F (p+ ) = 1; implying p i  1  j+ 12ij = km: This corresponds to
the prot obtained when each rm sells their product to the set of captive consumers, sharing
the group of selective consumers, who buy e¢ ciently. Assume now that p2 > p1 and take
pmax   pmin  2; a condition that will hold in the MSNE as we will later demonstrate. Take
p 2 [p1; p2] s.t. (25) holds. Then, 9ep s.t. ep   = pL < p1 and ep+  = pH > p2:
Since pL < p1 and pH > p2; it follows that
F (ep) = 2  2
ij

km
(ep  )   i  1  j

and F (ep) = 1  2
ij

kmep+    i  1  j

:
From the continuity of F it must be true that
2  2
ij

km
(ep  )   i  1  j

= 1  2
ij

kmep+    i  1  j

;
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implying the existence of a unique positive value of ep given by ep =q4kmij + 2.
Since this must hold 8p 2 [p1; p2] and they cannot all be equal it must be the case that
p1 = p2: Since p1 = pmin+ and p2 = pmax  it follows that pmin+ = pmax  or equivalently
pmax   pmin = 2:
Let p be the price of rm i, then given that pmax   pmin = 2: In this symmetric MSNE,
i = j = ; the c.d.f F
m(p) can be written as:
Fm(p) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
0 if p < pmin
1  2
(m)2

km
p+   m (1  m)

if pmin 5 p 5 pmax   
2  2
(m)2

km
p    m (1  m)

if pmax    < p 5 pmax
1 if p > pmax
9>>>>>=>>>>>;
(27)
From F (pmin) = 0 and F (pmax) = 1 it follows that
1  2
ij

km
pmin + 
  i
 
1  j

= 0() pmin = 2k
m
2i   ij
  
2  2
ij

km
pmax      i
 
1  j

= 1() pmax = 2k
m
2i   ij
+  (28)
By continuity, for p = pmax    = 2km2i ij ; we must have
2ij(k
m)2
(2i ij)
2   2km   ij2 2 = 0.
Hence
km =
i
2j
 
2  j
2 
1 +
q
1 + 2j
 
2  j
 2
; (29)
and
pmax = 
2  j
j

1 +
q
1 + 2j
 
2  j
 2
+ ; (30)
which is independent of rmsown advertising decisions.
Since pmax    = 2km2i ij , the expected prot of rm i; Ei = k
m  A (i) is equal to
Ei =
1
2
i (pmax   )
 
2  j
 A (i) :
In the interior solution, i 2 (0; 1), each rms advertising equilibrium level with mass
advertising is obtained by maximizing Ei with respect to i: From the rst order condition,
the interior solution is given by31 @k
m
@i
= Ai (i) which under symmetry writes as
1
2
(pmax   ) (2  m) = A (m) ; (31)
implying that equilibrium prots can be written as Ei = mA (m) A (m) :
31Note that the second order condition is satised. It is given by  A (m) < 0; which is always true, given
our assumptions with respect to the advertising technology.
31
Proof of Corollary 1 In the symmetric equilibrium, we have i = j = 
m. Introduce
this in (30) and then plug the resulting expression in the FOC concerning optimal advertising
choices (4):

 
(2  m)2
2m
!0@1 +
s
1 +

m
2  m
21A = A (m) ; (32)
Note that the RHS does not depend on : Thus, for a given m; an increase in  only shifts
upwards the marginal revenue associated with m (denoted by MgR; which is a decreasing
function of m): Therefore when  goes up, m also goes up (since the shift upwards of MgR
leads to an upwards movement along the marginal cost of advertising andA > 0, A  0):
Analogously, a reduction in the marginal cost of advertising moves this curve downwards,
generating a downward movement along the MgR curve and an increase in the equilibrium
advertising level (recall that the MgR is decreasing with m). 
Proof of Lemma 2. Considering the quadratic advertising technology, A (m) =  (m)2 ;
the equation (31) writes as:
1
2
(pmax   ) (2  m) = 2m: (33)
Substituting pmax by (30) and solving for m; we obtain the equilibrium advertising level32
given by:
m = 2
 
2 + 8
1=2
(2 + 8)1=2 + 4
: (34)
Simple algebra shows that m in equation (34) denes the interior optimal advertising level
as long as  >
p
2+1
4 ; otherwise 
m = 1. Plugging the optimal value of m by (34) in equation
(29) , we obtain km = 8(8+)h
4+(2+8)1=2
i2 and Em = A (m) = 4(2+8)
(2+8)1=2+4
2 :
Similarly, replacing m in equation (30), we get pmax =
 
2 + 8
1=2
+ ; and it can be
easily checked that, for v > 2; the condition pmax  v    requires
 <
1
8
(v   ) v   3

: (35)
When  is above the threshold in (35), the results in Proposition 2 do not hold as the
demand structure would be di¤erent from the one considered in the derivation of this Proposition.
Let us now compare (35) to the thresholds on  already pointed out in Lemma 1, i.e.  <
v 
4 max
n
v
v 2 ;
v 2

o
: First, note that 18 (v   ) v 3 <
 v 
4
 v 2
 for any v > : Second,
note that 18 (v   ) v 3 >
 v 
4

v
v 2 if v > 6:
Accordingly, the interior solution holds when
p
2 + 1
4
 <  <
v   
4
min

v   3
2
;
v
v   2

32Note that equation (33) had an additional solution, given by m = 2
p
2+8p
2+8 4
: However, it can be easily
seen that such solution cannot dene the optimal advertising level in an interior solution since it would always
lead to m > 1:
32
The previous condition is not empty if the two following conditions hold:
(i)
p
2+1
4  <
v 
4
v
v 2 ; which requires  (v) = 
2
 
2
p
2 + 2

+ v2   v  p2 + 2 > 0: This
second-degree polynomial above attains a minimum at v =  + 12
p
2; with 
 
 + 12
p
2

= p
2 + 12

2 > 0; meaning that condition condition (i) holds.
(ii)
p
2+1
4  <  <
v 
8
v 3
 ; which requires v > 
 p
2 + 3

:
In summary, when v > 
 p
2 + 3

and
p
2+1
4  <  <
 v 
4

min
n
v 3
2 ;
v
v 2
o
;we have an
interior equilibrium with the features described in Proposition 2.
Proof of Corollary 2. When 2 < v < 
 p
2 + 3

or when v > 
 p
2 + 3

and  <p
2+1
4 ; we have a corner solution in which 
m = 1: Replacing this advertising value in the
values of pmax and km in (30) and (29), we obtain the results in Corollary 2.
Proof of Lemma 3 The impact of  on Em is given by
@Em
@
=  4 4
2    2 + 8 32
482
p
2 + 8 + 643 + 122 + 962 + (2 + 8)
3
2
:
We have @E
m
@ > 0 if
42    2 + 8 32 < 0: (36)
Note that the LHS is decreasing with ; with the rst derivative with respect to  being
equal to: 4

   3
p
2 + 8

< 0: Therefore, to show that 42    2 + 8 32 < 0; it is
su¢ cient to show that the polynomial is negative in the smallest value of  =
(
p
2+1)
4 : For this
value of ; the LHS in (36) is equal to
  69p2  98 3 < 0; which guarantees that @Em@ > 0;
when  >
(
p
2+1)
4 :
Proof of Proposition 3 Let q 2 [0; 1] represent the probability with which each rm
serves its group of selective customers. Since the model is symmetric both rms have the same
support of prices. Then q can be written as:
q = 1  2
Z pmax
pmin+
Z pA 
pmin
f (pB) dpB

f (pA) dpA
Note that pA < pmax; which implies pA    < pmax    = pmin + ; which means thatZ pA 
pmin
f (pB) dpB = FB (pA   ) = 2
m
  1  2k
m
pA (
m)2
;
Note also that when computing the rst integral, we have pA > pmin + ; which means we
must obtain f (pA) from the third branch in the cdf, with f (pA) = 2 k
m
2(pA )2 .Thus, we haveR pmax
pmin+
R pA 
pmin
f (pB) dpB

f (pA) dpA =   ( 2)
2
2
+ 4k
2
24
ln

(pmax )2
pmax(pmax 2)

and, in the MSNE:
q = 1  8k
2
2 (m)4
ln
 
(pmax   )2
pmax (pmax   2)
!
+ 2
(m   2)2
(m)2
;
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In the case of the quadratic technology, we obtain
q = 1  322
h
1
2
ln
 
1
8 + 1
  1
2+8
i
:
Proof of Proposition 4. Each rm serves its group of selective customers at po with
probability given by z 2 [0; 1]:
z =
Z v 
prmin
 Z pB+
pomin
fo (po) dpo
!
f (pr) dpr +mr;
From the Proof of Proposition 1 in Esteves and Resende (2016) follows that
R pr+
pomin
fo (po) dpo =
F o (pr + ) = 1o

1  (v )(1 o)pr

and f (pr) = v (v )
o
r(pr+)2
: Thus:Z v 
prmin

1
o

1  (v   ) (1  
o)
pr

v   (v   )o
r (pr + )2

dpr )
) z =

v   
2vr

pomin

 + v

ln
(v   ) pomin
vprmin

o   1
o

+mr:
The value of z under the quadratic specication for the advertising cost function is obtained
by replacing pomin; p
r
min; 
o and r in (13). 
Proof of Proposition 5. (i) The condition pmin < prmin requires  14 X()(v+2 )2 < 0;with
X () =  1283 + 8 (v   )  2 (v   7)2 +   4v + 22 + v2+ (v   2) (v + 2) (v   )2
Accordingly, pmin < prmin , X () > 0: Note that X () is a third-degree polynomial on
 such that: (i) X () has at most three roots; (ii) lim! 1X () = +1; (iii) X (0) =
(v   )2 (v   2) (v + 2) > 0; and (iv) X 0 (0) = 8 (v   )   4v + 22 + v2 > 0 for v  p
2 + 3

. From (i)-(iv), it follows thatX () has exactly one positive root (since lim!+1X () =
 1). Note also that X

v 
4

v 3
2

=
  v   2 + v2 (v   )2 > 0; implying that the pos-
itive root of X () must be larger than v 4

v 3
2

: Consequently, given condition (A2), we
must have X () > 0 for  <
 v 
4

min
n
v 3
2 ;
v
v 2
o
; which implies pmin < prmin:
The condition pmax < prmax = v   follows directly from the fact that we are restricting our
analysis to the domain of parameters in which rms compete for all selective consumers in the
market, implying pmax < v    = prmax.
(ii) We have just shown that pmin  prmin and pmax  prmin: Moreover, we know that F r (p)
has a mass point at p = v ; and both cdf are increasing with p: To show that Fm (p) > F r (p) ;
8p; it is su¢ cient to show that this is the case when p =  2 + 81=2 ; which is the price for
which the slope of Fm changes (it increases). Since
Fm
 
2 + 8
1=2
=
4p
2 + 8

 +
p
2 + 8

F r
 
2 + 8
1=2
=
4

2
p
2 + 8 (v + 2  )  (v   ) (v + 4  2)

(v   )

 +
p
2 + 8

(v + 4  2)
;
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when 2
p
2 + 8 (v + 2  ) < (v   ) (v + 4  2) ; we have  2 + 81=2 < prmin; which
would necessarily imply that Fm (p) > F r (p) ;8p:
Otherwise, we need to compute K (v) = Fm
 
2 + 8
1=2   F r  2 + 81=2 ; with
K (v) > 0 i¤
( + ) v2 + ((4  3)    (12+ 5))v + ( (2   4)   4 (4+ ) (2  )) > 0;
 =
p
2 + 8: It can be shown that the polynomial K (v) is increasing33 with v; with
K 0 (v) =
p
2 + 8 (2v + 4  3) +  (2v   12  5) > 0
Hence, if K (v) > 0 for the lowest values of v in our domain, it will be positive in the
whole domain dened by conditions (A1) and (A2). In this respect, it is worth noting that the
condition  <
 v 
4
 v 3
2

can be re-written as  18  4v+3
2 8+v2
 < 0; implying
v > 2 +
p
 (8+ );
with K

2 +
p
 (8+ )

= 42 > 0:
The result that K (v) = Fm
 
2 + 8
1=2 F r  2 + 81=2 > 0; together with result
(i) in this Proposition and the fact that F r (p) has a mass point at prmax (whereas F
m has
not) implies Fm (p) > F r (p) for any price in the support of Fm (p) ; which proves point (ii) in
Proposition 5.
(iii) Since pomin = p
r
min + ; and pmin < p
r
min; we have that pmin +  < p
r
min +  = p
o
min: Since
pmin +  =
 
2 + 8
1=2, this means that Fm  2 + 81=2 > F o  2 + 81=2 = 0.
Taking into consideration that pmax < pomax (since pmax  v    and pomax = v) and the fact
that F o has no mass point, being equal to 1; only when p  v; then Fm (p) > F o (p) ; 8 < p < 
2 + 8
1=2
+ , implying result (iii) in Proposition 5.
(iv) Since pmin  prmin and pmax  prmin and Fm (p) > F r (p) ;8p; then it must the case
that E (pm) < E (pr) : The same applies mutatis mutandis, in the case of the rmsown strong
market segment, with E (pm) < E (po) :
Proof of Lemma 4. The condition m =
2(2+8)
1=2
(2+8)1=2+4
> r = v 4
v+4 2
2v+4 2 holds i¤
4 (v   ) (v + 4  2) +
p
2 + 8 ((v   ) (v + 4  2)  16 (v + 2  )) < 0: (37)
If
((v   ) (v + 4  2)  16 (v + 2  )) > 0; (38)
33To prove this result note that the rst term in K0 (v) is always positive, whereas the second one is positive
if v > 6 + 5
2
; which means that K0 (v) > 0 for v > 6 + 5
2
: Otherwise, K0 (v) > 0 requires Y (v) =
4v2 +
 
4 (4  ) + 2 v +  163   402   92   23 > 0;which is always the case since Y 0 (v) = 8v +
162   4 + 2 > 0 and, in the lowest possible value of v =  3 +p2 ; we have Y   3 +p2  > 0; implying
K0 (v) > 0 even when v < 6+ 5
2
:
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the condition (37) is never possible, implying r > m: Solving the inequality (38) for v; we get
the following su¢ cient condition to have r > m :
v > 6+
3
2
 +
1
2
q
2722 + 24 + 2
Note that this condition becomes easier to satisfy as advertising costs become lower. When
 =
(1+
p
2)
4 ; the condition becomes v > 10: 473: It can also be shown that for very low values
of v; we have m > r: In order to prove this result, rst notice that for the lowest possible
value of  = (
1+
p
2)
4 ; we get 
m = 1: Thus, if r < 1, v < (3
p
2+
p
6 2)
2(
p
2 1) = 5: 663 9; we have
m > r for  = (
1+
p
2)
4 : For  =
v 
4
v 3
2 (which constraints the largest admissible values of
); we still have m > r34: Since both advertising levels are decreasing with ; it must be the
case that m > r for (
1+
p
2)
4  <  <
v 
4
v 3
2 and v <
(3
p
2+
p
6 2)
2(
p
2 1) : 
Proof of Lemma 5. The condition m =
2(2+8)
1=2
(2+8)1=2+4
> o = v4+2(v ) holds i¤
4v+
p
2 + 8 ( 3v   8+ 4) < 0,
,  162   9 (8+ ) v2   24 (8+ ) (2  ) v   16 (8+ ) (2  )2 < 0:
For  < 34
 p
10 + 3

= 4: 621 7; the inequality always holds since all the terms in the LHS
are negative. For larger values of ; we need to solve the polynomial, obtaining35
v < v = 4 (2  ) 3 (8+ ) + 4
p
2 + 8 
162   9 (8+ )
Summing up, for v < v; we have m > o: For v > v; we only have m > o if  < 4: 621 7:
Proof of Proposition 6. For the quadratic advertising technology, we have Et =
2+v 
2

A (o) +A (r) and Em = A (m) : Thus Et   Em > 0 requires

2+ v   
2

A (o) +A (r) A (m) > 0,

2+ v   
2

>
(m)2   (r)2
(o)2
Denoting  (; v; ) = (
m)2 (r)2
(o)2
; the previous inequality can be written as
2 [1   (; v; )] + v    > 0:
If 2 [1   (; v; )] + v    = 0 then Et = Em: Otherwise, Em > Et:
34Note that m

 = v 
4
v 3
2

 r

 = v 
4
v 3
2

is equal to 2 8v
22 134+6v3 6v3+v4
(v 3)(v )(v+)( 2v 2+v2) ; which is pos-
itive since the denominator is positive upon direct observation and the numerator is also positive, since it is
increasing with v and it is positive for the lowest admissible value of v; v =
 
3 +
p
2

:
35The polynomial has a second root on v but it is negative for  <
3(
p
10+3)
4
:
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